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Abstract
This work is intended as an introduction to cryptographic secu-
rity and a motivation for the widely used Quantum Key Distribution
(QKD) security definition. We review the notion of security necessary
for a protocol to be usable in a larger cryptographic context, i.e., for
it to remain secure when composed with other secure protocols. We
then derive the corresponding security criterion for QKD. We provide
several examples of QKD composed in sequence and parallel with dif-
ferent cryptographic schemes to illustrate how the error of a composed
protocol is the sum of the errors of the individual protocols. We also
discuss the operational interpretations of the distance metric used to
quantify these errors.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The first Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols were proposed inde-
pendently by Bennett and Brassard [BB84] in 1984— inspired by early work
on quantum money by Wiesner [Wie83]—and by Ekert [Eke91] in 1991. The
original papers discussed security in the presence of an eavesdropper that
could perform only limited operations on the quantum channel. The first se-
curity proofs that considered an unbounded adversary were given more than
a decade later [May96,BBB+00,SP00,May01,BBB+06]. Another decade af-
ter the first such proof, Ko¨nig et al. [KRBM07] showed that the security
criterion used was insufficient: even though it guarantees that an eavesdrop-
per cannot guess the key, this only holds if the key is never used. If part
of the key is revealed to the eavesdropper— for example, by using it to en-
crypt a message known to her— the rest becomes insecure. A new security
criterion for QKD was introduced, along with a new proof of security for
BB84 [RK05,BHL+05,Ren05]. It was argued that ρKE, the joint state of the
final key (K) and quantum information gathered by an eavesdropper (E),
must be close to an ideal key, τK , that is perfectly uniform and independent
from the adversary’s information ρE:
(1− pabort)D(ρKE, τK ⊗ ρE) ≤ ε , (1)
where pabort is the probability that the protocol aborts,
1 D(·, ·) is the trace
distance2 and ε ∈ [0, 1] is a (small) real number.3
The type of security flaw suffered by the early QKD security criteria
is well known in classical cryptography. It was addressed independently by
Pfitzmann andWaidner [PW00,PW01,BPW04,BPW07] and Canetti [Can01,
CDPW07, Can13], who introduced general frameworks to define crypto-
graphic security, which they dubbed reactive simulatability and universal
composability, respectively. These frameworks were adapted to quantum
cryptography by Ben-Or and Mayers [BM04] and Unruh [Unr04, Unr10],
and the security of QKD was discussed within these frameworks by Ben-Or
et al. [BHL+05] and Mu¨ller-Quade and Renner [MQR09]. Recently, Mau-
rer and Renner [MR11] introduced a new cryptographic security framework,
Abstract Cryptography (AC), which both simplifies and generalizes previous
frameworks, and applies equally to the classical and quantum settings.
The core idea of all these security frameworks is to prove that the func-
tionality constructed by the real protocol is indistinguishable from the func-
1In [Ren05], Eq. (1) was introduced with a subnormalized state ρKE, with tr(ρKE) =
1 − pabort, instead of explicitly writing the factor (1 − pabort). The two formulations are
however mathematically equivalent.
2This metric is defined and discussed in detail in Appendix A.
3Another formulation of this security criterion, (1−pabort)minσE D(ρKE , τK ⊗ σE) ≤ ε,
has also been proposed in the literature. We discuss this alternative in Appendix B.
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tionality of an ideal resource that fulfills in a perfect way whatever task
is expected of the cryptographic protocol— in the case of QKD, this ideal
resource provides the two players with a perfect key, unknown to the adver-
sary. If this ideal system is indistinguishable from the real one, then one
can be substituted for the other in any context. Players who run a QKD
protocol can thus treat the resulting key as if it were perfect, which triv-
ially implies that it can be safely used and composed arbitrarily with other
(secure) protocols.
1.2 Contributions
Since the security criterion of Eq. (1) provides the aforementioned compo-
sitional guarantees, it is widely used in the QKD literature and generally
introduced as the correct security definition (see, e.g., the QKD review pa-
per [SBPC+09]). A more detailed explanation as to why this is the case
is however usually omitted due to the highly involved security frameworks.
Even the technical works [RK05,BHL+05,Ren05,MQR09] that introduced
and discuss Eq. (1) do not provide a self contained justification of this se-
curity notion. The current paper aims to fill in this gap by revisiting the
security of QKD using the AC framework.
Our goals are twofold. Firstly, we provide an introduction to crypto-
graphic security. We do not discuss the AC framework in detail, but explain
the main ideas underlying cryptographic security and illustrate protocol
composition with many examples. Secondly, we use this framework to show
how Eq. (1) can be derived. We also provide in Appendix A an extensive dis-
cussion of the interpretation and operational meaning of the trace distance
used in Eq. (1).
1.3 Abstract cryptography
The traditional approach to defining security [PW00,PW01,Can01] can be
seen as bottom-up. One first defines (at a low level) a computational model
(e.g., a Turing machine). One then defines how the machines communicate
(e.g., by writing to and reading from shared tapes) and some form of schedul-
ing. Next, one can define notions of complexity and efficiency. Finally, the
security of a cryptosystem can be defined.
Abstract cryptography (AC) on the other hand uses a top-down ap-
proach. In order to state definitions and develop a theory, one starts from
the other end, the highest possible level of abstraction— the composition of
abstract systems—and proceeds downwards, introducing in each new lower
level only the minimal necessary specializations. The (in)distinguishability
of the real and ideal systems is defined as a metric on abstract systems,
which, at a lower level, can be chosen to capture the distinguishing power
of a computationally bounded or unbounded environment. The abstract
2
systems are instantiated with, e.g., a synchronous or asynchronous network
of (abstract) machines. These machines can be instantiated with either
classical or quantum processes.
One may give the analogous example of group theory, which is used
to describe matrix multiplication. In the bottom-up approach, one would
start explaining how matrices are multiplied, and then based on this find
properties of the matrix multiplication. In contrast to this, the top-down
approach would correspond to first defining the (abstract) multiplication
group and prove theorems already on this level. The matrix multiplication
would then be introduced as a special case of the multiplicative group. This
simplifies greatly the framework by avoiding unnecessary specificities from
lower levels, and does not hard code a computation or communication model
(e.g., classical or quantum, synchronous or asynchronous) in the security
framework.
1.4 Structure of this paper
In Section 2 we start by introducing a simplified version of the AC frame-
work [MR11], which is sufficient for the specific adversarial structure relevant
to QKD, namely honest Alice and Bob, and dishonest Eve. In Section 3 we
model the real and ideal systems of a generic QKD protocol, and plug it
in the AC security framework, obtaining a security definition for QKD. In
Section 4 we then prove that this can be reduced to Eq. (1).4 In Section 5
we illustrate the composition of protocols in AC with examples of QKD com-
posed in various settings. We emphasize that this section does not prove
that the QKD security criterion is composable— the proof of this follows
from the generic proof that the AC framework is composable [MR11]— but
illustrates how the security of composed protocols results from the security
of individual protocols and the triangle inequality. Further examples can
be found in Appendix D, where we model the security of authentication
and compose it with QKD, resulting in a key expansion protocol. We also
provide a substantial review of the trace distance and its operational inter-
pretations in Appendix A. In particular, we prove that it corresponds to
the probability a distinguisher has of correctly guessing whether it is inter-
acting with the real or ideal QKD system— the measure used in the AC
framework— and discuss how to interpet this. An overview of the other
appendices is given on page 31.
4More precisely, the security definition of QKD is reduced to a combination of two
criteria, secrecy (captured by Eq. (1)) and correctness.
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2 Cryptographic security
A central element in modeling security is that of resources—resources used
in protocols and resources constructed by protocols. For example, a QKD
protocol constructs a functionality which shares a secret key between two
players. This functionality is a resource, which can be used by other pro-
tocols, e.g., to encrypt a message. To construct this secret key resource,
a QKD protocol typically uses two other resources, an authentic classical
channel5 and an insecure quantum channel. The authentic channel resource
can in turn be constructed from an insecure channel resource and a pass-
word6 [RW03]. Composing the authentication protocol with the QKD pro-
tocol results in a scheme which constructs a secret key from a password and
insecure channels. Part of the resulting secret key can be used in further
rounds of authentication and QKD to produce even more secret key. This
is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
For any cryptographic task one can define an ideal resource which full-
fils this task in a perfect way. A protocol is then considered secure if the
real resource actually constructed is indistinguishable from a system run-
ning the ideal resource.7 This notion of security based on distinguishing
real and ideal systems is explained informally in Section 2.1. It is then il-
lustrated with the one-time pad8 in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3 we give a
formal security definition in the Abstract Cryptography (AC) framework
for the special case of three party protocols with honest Alice and Bob,
and dishonest Eve. Finally, in Section 2.4 we discuss how the metric used to
quantify the (in)distinguishability between the real and ideal settings should
be interpreted.
2.1 Real-world ideal-world paradigm
Cryptography aims at providing security guarantees in the presence of an
adversary. And traditionally, security has been defined with respect to the
information gathered by this adversary— but, as we shall see, this can be
insufficient to achieve the desired security guarantees. A typical example
of this is the security criterion used in early papers on QKD, e.g., [May96,
5An authentic channel guarantees that the message received comes from the legitimate
sender, and has not been tampered with or generated by an adversary.
6A short key K with min-entropy H∞(K) = Ω(log |K|) is sufficient for authentica-
tion [RW03], where K is the key alphabet— i.e., having H∞(K) linear in the key length
log |K| is sufficient. We refer to such a weak key as a password.
7Note that we use the notions real and ideal in a relative sense: the ideal resource that
we wish to construct with one protocol might be considered a real resource available to
another protocol.
8The one-time pad is an encryption scheme that XORs every bit of a message x with
a bit of a key k, and transmits the resulting ciphertext y = x ⊕ k to the receiver. The
message, which can be decrypted by performing the reverse operation x = y⊕k, is hidden
from any player who intercepts the ciphertext y but has no knowledge of the key k.
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Short password
Insecure
classical channel
Authentic
channel
Insecure quan-
tum channel
Long secret key
Insecure
classical channel
Insecure
classical channel
Authentic
channel
Authentic
channel
Secure channel
Insecure quan-
tum channel
Long secret key
Authentication
QKD
Authentication Authentication
One-time pad QKD
Figure 2.1 – A cryptographic protocol uses (weak) resources to construct
other (stronger) resources. These resources are depicted in the boxes, and
the arrows are protocols. Each box is a one-time-use resource, so the same
resource appears in multiple boxes if different protocols require it. The long
secret key resource in the center of the figure is split in three shorter keys, and
each protocol uses one of these keys.
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BBB+00,SP00,May01]. LetK be the secret key produced by a run of a QKD
protocol, and Y be a random variable obtained by an adversary attacking
the scheme and measuring her quantum system E. It can be argued that
the key is unknown to the adversary if she gains only negligible information
about it, i.e., if for all attacks and measurements of the resulting quantum
system,
I(K;Y ) ≈ 0 , (2)
where I(K;Y ) is the mutual information9 between K and Y .
However, even if a key obtained from a protocol satisfying Eq. (2) is
used in a perfectly secure encryption scheme like the one-time pad, it can
leak information about the message. Ko¨nig et al. [KRBM07] give such an
example: they find a quantum state ρKE which satisfies Eq. (2), but which
cannot be used to encrypt a message partly known to an adversary. They
show that if the key is split in two, K = K1K2, and the adversary delays
measuring her system E until the first part, K1, is revealed to her— e.g.,
because a known message was encrypted by the one-time pad with K1—she
can obtain information about the rest of the key. More precisely, they prove
that for this state ρK1K2E ,
I(K2;Y
′)≫ 0 ,
where Y ′ is a random variable obtained by a measurement of the joint state
ρK1E consisting of the partial key K1 and the quantum information E gath-
ered during the QKD protocol.10 Even though the key obtained from the
QKD protocol is approximately uniform and independent from the adver-
sary’s information Y , it is unusable in a cryptographic context, and another
approach than the adversarial viewpoint is necessary for defining crypto-
graphic security.
This new approach was proposed independently by Canetti [Can01] and
Pfitzmann and Waidner [PW00,PW01] for classical cryptography. The gist
of their global security paradigm lies in measuring how well some real proto-
col can be distinguished from some ideal system that fullfils the task in an
ideal way, and is often referred to as the “real-world ideal-world” paradigm.11
To do this, the notion of an adversary is dropped in favor of a distin-
guisher. Apart from having the capabilities of the adversary, this distin-
guisher also encompasses any protocol that is run before, after, and during
the protocol being analyzed. The role of the distinguisher is to capture
“the rest of the world”, everything that exists outside of the honest play-
ers and the resources they share. A distinguisher is defined as an entity
that can choose the inputs of the honest players (that might come from a
9This information measure, the maximum mutual information over all measurements
of the quantum system, is called accessible information.
10This phenomenon is called information locking [DHL+04,Win14].
11As already noted in Footnote 7, we use the notions real and ideal in a relative sense.
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previously run protocol), receives their outputs (that could be used in a
subsequent protocol), and simultaneously fullfils the role of the adversary,
possibly eavesdropping on the communication channels and tampering with
messages. This distinguisher is given a black box access to either the real
or an ideal system, and must decide with which of the two it is interact-
ing. A protocol is then considered secure if the real system constructed is
indistinguishable from the ideal one. This is illustrated in Figure 2.2.
Real system
Distinguisher
0, 1
Ideal system
Distinguisher
0, 1
Figure 2.2 – A distinguisher has a complete description of two systems, and is
given a black-box access to one of the two. After interacting with the system,
it must guess which one it is holding.
In the case of QKD, this means that the distinguisher does not only
obtain the system E of the eavesdropper, but also receives the final key K
generated by Alice and Bob. In the real world, this key is potentially corre-
lated to E, and in an ideal system, K is uniformly random and independent
from E. The distinguisher can then run the attack of Ko¨nig et al. [KRBM07]
to distinguish between the real and ideal systems: if Y ′, the result of the
measurement of K1 and E is correlated to K2, it knows that it was given
the real system, otherwise it must have the ideal one. This specific attack
is illustrated in more detail in Section 5.1.
2.2 Example: one-time pad
In this section, we illustrate with the one-time pad how security is defined
in the real-world ideal-world paradigm. The one-time pad protocol uses a
secret key k to encrypt a message x as y := x⊕ k. The ciphertext y is then
sent on an authentic channel to the receiver, who decrypts it, obtaining
x = y ⊕ k. y is however also leaked to the adversary that is eavesdropping
on the authentic channel. This is depicted in Figure 2.3.
The one-time pad protocol thus uses two resources, a secret key and an
authentic channel. The resource we wish to construct with this encryption
scheme is a secure channel: a resource which transmits a message x from the
sender to the receiver, and leaks only information about the message size
|x| at the adversary’s interface, but not the contents of the message. This
7
y =
x⊕ k
πotp
A
Alice
x =
y ⊕ k
πotp
B
Bob
key
Secret key
Authentic channel
Eve
k k
x x
y y
y
Figure 2.3 – The real one-time pad system— Alice has access to the left
interface, Bob to the right interface and Eve to the lower interface— consists
of the one-time pad protocol (πotpA , π
otp
B ), and the secret key and authentic
channel resources. The combination of these resources and protocol constructs
a system that takes a message x at Alice’s interface, outputs a ciphertext y at
Eve’s interface and the original message x at Bob’s interface.
is illustrated in Figure 2.4.
Alice Bob
Eve
x x
|x|
Figure 2.4 – A secure channel from Alice to Bob leaks only the message size
at Eve’s interface.
Since an ideal resource “magically” solves the cryptographic task con-
sidered, e.g., by producing perfect secret keys or transmitting a message
directly from Alice to Bob, the adversary’s interface of the ideal resource
is usually quite different from her interface of the real system, which gives
her access to the resources used. For the one-time pad, the real system
from Figure 2.3 outputs a string y at Eve’s interface, but the ideal secure
channel from Figure 2.4 outputs an integer, |x|. To make the comparison
between real and ideal systems possible, we define the ideal system to con-
sist of the ideal resource as well as a simulator plugged into the adversary’s
interface of the ideal resource, that recreates the communication occurring
in the real system. For the one-time pad, this simulator must generate a
ciphertext y given the message length |x|. This is simply done by gener-
ating a random string of the appropriate length, as depicted in Figure 2.5.
Note that putting such a simulator between the ideal resource and the adver-
sary can only weaken her, since any operation performed by the simulator
could equivalently be performed by an adversary connected directly to the
interface of the ideal resource.
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Secure channel
Alice Bob
σotpE Random string
x x
|x|
Eve
y
Figure 2.5 – The ideal one-time pad system— Alice has access to the left
interface, Bob to the right interface and Eve to the lower interface— consists
of the ideal secure channel and a simulator σotpE that generates a random string
y of length |x|.
To prove that the one-time pad constructs a secure channel from an
authentic channel and a secret key, we view the real and ideal one-time
pad systems of Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.5 as black boxes, and need to show
that no distinguisher can tell with which of the two it has been connected.
For both black boxes, if the distinguisher inputs x at Alice’s interface, the
same string x is output at Bob’s interface and a uniformly random string of
length |x| is output at Eve’s interface. The two systems are thus completely
indistinguishable— if the distinguisher were to take a guess, it would be
right with probability exactly 1/2— and we say that the one-time pad has
perfect security.
If two systems are indistinguishable, they can be used interchangeably in
any setting. For example, let some protocol π′ be proven secure if Alice and
Bob are connected by a secure channel. Since the one-time pad constructs
such a channel, it can be used in lieu of the secure channel, and composed
with π′. Or equivalently, the contrapositive: if composing the one-time pad
and π′ were to leak some vital information, which would not happen with a
secure channel, a distinguisher that is either given the real or ideal system
could run π′ internally and check whether this leak occurs to know with
which of the two it is interacting.
2.3 General security definition
The previous sections introduced the concepts of resources, protocols and
simulator in an informal manner. In the AC framework these elements are
defined in an abstract way. For example, a resource is an abstract system
that is shared between all players and provides each one with an interface
that allows in- and outputs. AC does not define the internal workings of a
resource. It postulates axioms that these abstract systems must fulfill— e.g.
there must exist a metric and a parallel composition operator on the space of
resources—and is valid for any instantiation which respects these axioms. In
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the group theory analogy introduced in Section 1.3, these axioms correspond
to the group axioms (closure, associativity, identity and invertibility). Any
set and operation that respects these group axioms is an instantiation of a
group, and any theorem proven for groups applies to this instantiation.
Thus, AC defines cryptographic security for abstract systems which ful-
fill certain basic properties. In the following we briefly sketch what these
are. Note that examples— such as the model of the one-time pad given
in Figures 2.3 and 2.5— necessarily assume some instantiation of the ab-
stract systems. Since we consider only simple examples in this work, we do
not provide formal generic definitions of these lower levels, and refer to the
discussions in [MR11,Mau12,DFPR14] on how this can be modeled.
Resource. An I-resource is an (abstract) system with interfaces specified
by a set I (e.g., I = {A,B,E}). Each interface i ∈ I is accessible to a
user i and provides her or him with certain controls (the possibility of read-
ing outputs and providing inputs). Resources are equipped with a parallel
composition operator, ‖ , that maps two resources to another resource.
Converter. To transform one resource into another, we use converters.
These are (abstract) systems with two interfaces, an inside interface and an
outside interface. The inside interface connects to an interface of a resource,
and the outside interface becomes the new interface of the constructed re-
source. We write either αiR or Rαi to denote the new resource with the
converter α connected at the interface i of R,12 and αR or Rα for a set of
converters α = {αi}i, for which it is clear to which interface they connect.
A protocol is a set of converters (one for every honest player) and a
simulator is also a converter. Another type of converter that we need is
a filter, which we often denote by ♯ or ♦. When placed over a dishonest
player’s interface, a filter prevents access to the corresponding controls and
emulates an honest behavior.
Serial and parallel composition of converters is defined as follows:
(αβ)iR := αi(βiR) and (α‖β)i(R‖S) := (αiR)‖(βiS) . (3)
Filtered resource. A pair of a resource R and a filter ♯ together specify
the (reactive) behavior of a system both when no adversary is present—
with the filter plugged in the adversarial interface, R♯E—and in the case of
a cheating player that removes the filter and has full access to her interface
of R. We call such a pair (R, ♯) a filtered resource, and usually denote it by
R♯.
12There is no mathematical difference between αiR and Rαi. It sometimes simplifies
the notation to have the converters for some players written on the right of the resource
and the ones for other players on the left, instead of all on the same side, hence the two
notations.
10
Metric. There must exist a pseudo-metric d(·, ·) on the space of resources,
i.e., for any three resources R, S,T, it satisfies the following conditions:13
(identity) d(R,R) = 0 , (4)
(symmetry) d(R, S) = d(S,R) , (5)
(triangle inequality) d(R, S) ≤ d(R,T) + d(T, S) . (6)
Furthermore, this pseudo-metric must be non-increasing under composition
with resources and converters: for any converter α and resources R, S,T, we
require
d(αR, αS) ≤ d(R, S) and d(R‖T, S‖T) ≤ d(R, S) . (7)
We are now ready to define the security of a cryptographic protocol. We
do so in the three player setting, for honest Alice and Bob, and dishonest Eve.
Thus, in the following, all resources have three interfaces, denoted A, B and
E, and we only consider honest behaviors (given by a protocol (πA, πB)) at
the A and B-interfaces, but arbitrary behavior at the E-interface. We refer
to [MR11] for the general case, when arbitrary players can be dishonest.
Definition 2.1 (Cryptographic security [MR11]). Let πAB = (πA, πB) be a
protocol and R♯ = (R, ♯) and S♦ = (S,♦) denote two filtered resources. We
say that πAB constructs S♦ from R♯ within ε, which we write R♯
π,ε
−−→ S♦, if
the two following conditions hold:
i) We have
d(πABR♯E , S♦E) ≤ ε .
ii) There exists a converter σE—which we call simulator— such that
d(πABR,SσE) ≤ ε .
If it is clear from the context what filtered resources R♯ and S♦ are meant,
we simply say that πAB is ε-secure.
The first of these two conditions measures how close the constructed
resource is to the ideal resource in the case where no malicious player is
intervening, which we call availability.14 The second condition captures
security in the presence of an adversary. These two equations are illustrated
in Figure 2.6.
13If additionally d(R, S) = 0 =⇒ R = S, then d is a metric.
14This is sometimes referred to as the correctness of the protocol in the cryptographic
literature. But in QKD, correctness has another meaning— namely the probability that
Alice and Bob end up with different keys when Eve is active. Instead, the term robustness
is traditionally used to denote the performance of a QKD protocol under honest (noisy)
conditions. We refer to Section 4.4 for a discussion of the relation between availability
and robustness.
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πA πB
R
♯E
≈ε
S
♦E
(a) Condition (i) from Definition 2.1. If Eve’s interfaces are blocked by fil-
ters emulating honest behavior, the functionality constructed by the protocol
should be indistinguishable from the ideal resource.
πA πB
R
≈ε
S
σE
(b) Condition (ii) from Definition 2.1. If Eve accesses her cheating interface of
R, the resulting system must be simulatable in the ideal world by a converter
σE that only accesses Eve’s interface of the ideal resource S.
Figure 2.6 – A protocol (πA, πB) constructs S♦ from R♯ within ε if the two
conditions illustrated in this figure hold. The sequences of arrows at the inter-
faces between the objects represent (arbitrary) rounds of communication.
It follows from the AC framework [MR11] that if two protocols π and π′
are ε- and ε′-secure, the composition of the two is (ε+ ε′)-secure. We illus-
trate this with several examples in Section 5 and Appendix D, and sketch a
generic proof in Appendix C.2.
2.4 The distinguishing metric
The usual pseudo-metric used to define security in the real-world ideal-world
paradigm is the distinguishing advantage, defined as follows. If a distin-
guisher D can guess correctly with probability pDdistinguish(R, S) with which
of two systems R and S it is interacting, we define its advantage as
dD(R, S) := 2pDdistinguish(R, S) − 1 . (8)
Changing the power of the distinguisher D (e.g., computationally bounded
or unbounded) results in different metrics and different levels of security. In
this work we are interested only in information-theoretic security, we there-
fore consider only a computationally unbounded distinguisher, and drop the
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superscript D. We write
d(R, S) ≤ ε or R ≈ε S ,
if two systems R and S can be distinguished with advantage at most ε, and
in the following, the distance between two resources always refers to the
distinguishing advantage of an unbounded distinguisher. A more extensive
discussion of distinguishers is given in Appendix C.1.
Although any pseudo-metric which satisfies the basic axioms can be used
in Definition 2.1, the distinguishing advantage is of particular importance,
because it has an operational definition— the advantage a distinguisher has
in guessing whether it is interacting with the real or ideal system. If the
distinguisher notices a difference between the two, then something in the real
setting did not behave ideally. This can be loosely interpreted as a failure
occurring. If the distinguisher can guess correctly with probability 1 with
which system it is interacting, a failure must occur systematically. If it can
only guess correctly with probability 1/2, no failure occurs at all. If it can
guess correctly with probability p, this can be seen as a failure occurring
with probability ε = 2p − 1. The distinguishing advantage can thus be
interpreted as the probability that a failure occurs in the real protocol.15
And in any practical implementation, the value ε can be chosen accordingly.
A bound on the security of a protocol does however not tell us how “bad”
this failure is. For example, a key distribution protocol which produces a
perfectly uniform key, but with probability ε Alice and Bob end up with
different keys, is ε-secure. Likewise, a protocol which gives 1 bit of the key to
Eve with probability ε, but is perfect otherwise, and another protocol which
gives the entire key to Eve with probability ε, but is perfect otherwise, are
both ε-secure as well. One could argue that leaking the entire key is worse
than leaking one bit, which is worse than not leaking anything but generating
mismatching keys, and this should be reflected in the level of security of the
protocol. However, leaking one bit can be as bad as leaking the entire key if
only one bit of the message is vital, and this happens to be the bit obtained
by Eve. Having mismatching keys and therefore misinterpreting a message
could have more dire consequences than leaking the message to Eve. How
bad a failure is depends on the use of the protocol, and since the purpose of
cryptographic security is to make a security statement that is valid for all
contexts, bounding the probability that a failure occurs is the best it can
do.
Since such a security bound gives no idea of the gravity of a failure— a
faulty QKD protocol might not only leak the current key, but all future keys
as well if the current key is used to authenticate messages in future rounds—
the probability ε of a failure occurring must be chosen small enough that the
15A formal derivation of this interpretation is given in Appendix A.3 for the trace dis-
tance— the distinguishing advantage between two quantum states.
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accumulation of all possible failure probabilities over a lifetime is still small
enough. For example, if an implementation of a QKD protocol produces a
key at a rate of 1 Mbit/s with a failure per bit of 10−24, then this protocol
can be run for the age of the universe and still have an accumulated failure
strictly less than 1.
3 Quantum key distribution
In order to apply the general AC security definition to QKD, we need to
specify the ideal key filtered resource, which we do in Section 3.1. Likewise,
we specify in Section 3.2 the real QKD system consisting of the protocol,
an authentic classical channel and an insecure quantum channel. Plugging
these systems in Definition 2.1, we obtain in Section 3.3 the security criteria
for QKD.
3.1 Ideal key
The goal of a key distribution protocol is to generate a secret key shared
between two players. One can represent such a resource by a box, one end
of which is in Alice’s lab, and another in Bob’s. It provides each of them
with a secret key of a given length, but does not give Eve any information
about the key. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1a, and is the key resource we
used in the one-time pad construction (Figure 2.3).
However, if we wish to realize such a functionality with QKD, there is
a caveat: an eavesdropper can always prevent any real QKD protocol from
generating a key by cutting or jumbling the communication lines between
Alice and Bob, and this must be reflected in the definition of the ideal re-
source. This box thus also has an interface accessible to Eve, which provides
her with a switch that, when pressed, prevents the box from generating this
key. We depict this in Figure 3.1b.
If modeled with the secret key resource of Figure 3.1b, the one-time
pad is trivially secure conditioned on Eve preventing a key from being dis-
tributed— in this case, Alice and Bob do not have a key and do not run
the one-time pad. The security of the one-time pad is thus reduced to the
case where a key is generated, which corresponds to Figure 3.1a and is the
situation analyzed in Section 2.2.
If no adversary is present, a filter covers Eve’s interface of the resource,
making it inaccessible to the distinguisher. This filter emulates the honest
behavior that one expects in the case of a non-malicious noisy channel. For
a protocol and noisy channel that together produce a key with probability
1 − δ, the filter should flip the switch on the E-interface of the ideal key
with probability δ. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1c, and discussed in more
detail in Section 4.4.
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Alice Bob
Eve
key
k k
(a) A resource that always gives a
key k to Alice and Bob, and nothing
to Eve.
Alice Bob
Eve
key
k,⊥ k,⊥
0, 1
(b) A resource that allows Eve to de-
cide if Alice and Bob get a key k or
an error ⊥.
key
Secret key K
k,⊥ k,⊥
♦E
0, 1
(c) The resource from Figure 3.1b
with a filter ♦E , modeling the case
with no adversary.
key
Secret key K
k,⊥ k,⊥
σE
0, 1
(d) The resource from Figure 3.1b
with a simulator σE .
Figure 3.1 – Some depictions of shared secret key resources, with filter and
simulator converters in the last two.
Remark 3.1 (Adaptive key length). For a protocol to construct the shared
secret key resource of Figure 3.1b, it must either abort or produce a key of
a fixed length. A more practical protocol could adapt the secret key length
to the noise level on the quantum channel. This provides the adversary
with the functionality to control the key length (not only whether it gets
generated or not), and can be modeled by allowing the key length to be
input at Eve’s interface of the ideal key resource.
3.2 Real protocol
To construct the secret key resource of Figure 3.1b, a QKD protocol uses
some other resources: a two-way authentic classical channel and an insecure
quantum channel. An authentic channel faithfully transmits messages be-
tween Alice and Bob, but provides Eve with a copy as well. An insecure
channel is completely under the control of Eve, she can apply any operation
allowed by physics to the message on the channel. If Eve does not intervene,
some noise might still be present on the channel, which is modeled by a fil-
ter that prevents Eve from reading the message, but introduces honest noise
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instead. Since an authentic channel can be constructed from an insecure
channel and a short shared secret key,16 QKD is sometimes referred to as a
key expansion protocol.17
A QKD protocol typically has three phases: quantum state distribu-
tion, error estimation and classical post-processing (for a detailed review of
QKD see [SBPC+09]). In the first, Alice sends some quantum states on
the insecure channel to Bob, who measures them upon reception, obtain-
ing a classical string. In the error estimation phase, they communicate on
the (two-way) authentic classical channel to sample some bits at random
positions in the string and estimate the noise on the quantum channel by
comparing these values to what Bob should have obtained. If the noise level
is above a certain threshold, they abort the protocol and output an error
message. If the noise is low enough, they move on to the third phase, and
make use of the authentic channel to perform error correction and privacy
amplification on their respective strings, resulting in keys kA and kB (which,
ideally, should be equal). We sketch this in Figure 3.2.
Remark 3.2 (Source of entanglement). In this work we use an insecure quan-
tum channel from Alice to Bob to construct the shared secret key resource.
An alternative resource that is frequently used in QKD instead of this inse-
cure channel, is a source of entangled states under the control of Eve. The
source sends half of an entangled state to Alice and another half to Bob. It
can be modeled similarly to the insecure channel depicted in Figure 3.2, but
with the first arrow reversed: the states are sent from Eve to Alice and from
Eve to Bob.
3.3 Security
Let (πqkdA , π
qkd
B ) be the QKD protocol. Let Q and A be the insecure quantum
channel and authentic classical channel, respectively, with their filters ♯E and
♭E . Let K denote the secret key resource of Figure 3.1b and let ♦E be its
filter. Applying Definition 2.1, we find that (πqkdA , π
qkd
B ) constructs K♦ from
Q♯ and A♭ within ε if
πqkdA π
qkd
B (Q‖A)(♯E‖♭E) ≈ε K♦E (9)
and
∃σE, π
qkd
A π
qkd
B (Q‖A) ≈ε KσE . (10)
The left- and right-hand sides of Eq. (9) are illustrated in Figures 3.2b and
3.1c, and the left- and right-hand sides of Eq. (10) are illustrated in Fig-
ures 3.2a and 3.1d. These two conditions are decomposed into simpler cri-
teria in Section 4.
16In fact, a short non-uniform key is sufficient for authentication [RW03], see Footnote 6.
17We model QKD this way in Appendix D.3.
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πqkd
A
πqkd
BAuthentic channel A
Insecure channel Q
t t
t
kA,⊥ kB,⊥
ρ ρ′
(a) When Eve is present, her interface gives her complete controle of the inse-
cure channel and allows her to read the messages on the authentic channel.
πqkd
A
πqkd
BAuthentic channel A
Insecure channel Q
♯E
♭E
t t
t
kA,⊥ kB,⊥
ρ ρ′
(b) When no eavesdropper is present, filters forward Alice’s quantum messages
to Bob and block the authentic channel’s output at the E-interface. The filter
♯E might produce non-malicious noise that modifies ρ and models a (honest)
noisy channel.
Figure 3.2 – The real QKD system— Alice has access to the left interface,
Bob to the right interface and Eve to the lower interface— consists of the
protocol (πqkdA , π
qkd
B ), the insecure quantum channel Q and two-way authentic
classical channel A. Alice and Bob abort if the insecure channel is too noisy,
i.e., if ρ′ is not similar enough to ρ to obtain a secret key of the desired length.
They run the classical post-processing over the authentic channel, obtaining
keys kA and kB. The message t depicted on the two-way authentic channel
represents the entire classical transcript of the classical post-processing.
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4 Security reduction
By applying the general AC security definition to QKD, we obtained two
criteria, Eqs. (9) and (10), capturing availability and security, respectively.
In this section we derive Eq. (1), the trace distance criterion discussed in
the introduction, from Eq. (10). We first show in Section 4.1 that the dis-
tinguishing advantage used in the previous sections reduces to the trace
distance between the quantum states gathered by the distinguisher interact-
ing with the real and ideal systems. Then in Section 4.2, we fix the simulator
σE from the ideal system. In Section 4.3 we decompose the resulting secu-
rity criterion into a combination of secrecy—Eq. (1)— and correctness—
the probability that Alice’s and Bob’s keys differ. In the last section, 4.4,
we consider the security condition of Eq. (9), which captures whether, in
the absence of a malicious adversary, the protocol behaves as specified by
the ideal resource and corresponding filter. We show how this condition can
be used to model the robustness of the protocol— the probability that the
protocol aborts with non-malicious noise.
4.1 Trace distance
The security criteria given in Eqs. (9) and (10) are defined in terms of the
distinguishing advantage between resources. To simplify these equations,
we rewrite them in terms of the trace distance, D(·, ·). A formal definition
of this metric is given in Appendix A.1, along with a discussion of how to
interpret it in the rest of Appendix A. We start with the simpler case of
Eq. (9) in the next paragraph, then deal with Eq. (10) after that.
The two resources on the left- and right-hand sides of Eq. (9) simply
output classical strings (a key or error message) at Alice and Bob’s interfaces.
Let these pairs of strings be given by the joint probability distributions PAB
and P˜AB . The distinguishing advantage between these systems is thus simply
the distinguishing advantage between these probability distributions— a
distinguisher is given a pair of strings sampled according to either PAB or
P˜AB and has to guess from which distribution it was sampled— i.e.,
d
(
πqkdA π
qkd
B (Q‖A)(♯E‖♭E),K♦E
)
= d(PAB , P˜AB) .
The distinguishing advantage between two probability distributions is equal
to their total variation distance18—which we prove in in Appendix A.2—
i.e., d(PAB , P˜AB) = D(PAB , P˜AB). Putting the two together we get
d
(
πqkdA π
qkd
B (Q‖A)(♯E‖♭E),K♦E
)
= D(PAB , P˜AB) ,
18The total variation distance between two probability distributions is equivalent to the
trace distance between the corresponding (diagonal) quantum states. We use the same
notation for both metrics, D(·, ·), since the former is a special case of the latter.
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where PAB and P˜AB are the distributions of the strings output by the real
and ideal systems, respectively.
The resources on the left- and right-hand sides of Eq. (10) are slightly
more complex. They first output a state ϕC at the E-interface, namely the
quantum states prepared by Alice, which she sends on the insecure quantum
channel. Without loss of generality, the distinguisher now applies any map
E : L(HC)→ L(HCE′) allowed by quantum physics to this state, obtaining
ρCE′ = E(ϕC) and puts the C register back on the insecure channel for
Bob, keeping the part in E′. Finally, the systems output some keys (or
error messages) at the A and B-interfaces, and a transcript of the post-
processing at the E-interface. Let ρEABE denote the tripartite state held by
a distinguisher interacting with the real system, and let ρ˜EABE denote the
state held after interacting with the ideal system, where the registers A and
B contain the final keys or error messages, and the register E holds both
the state ρE′ obtained from tampering with the quantum channel and the
post-processing transcript. Distinguishing between these two systems thus
reduces to maximizing over the distinguisher strategies (the choice of E) and
distinguishing between the resulting states, ρEABE and ρ˜
E
ABE :
d
(
πqkdA π
qkd
B (Q‖A),KσE
)
= max
E
d
(
ρEABE , ρ˜
E
ABE
)
.
The advantage a distinguisher has in guessing whether it holds the state
ρEABE or ρ˜
E
ABE is given by the trace distance between these states, i.e.,
d
(
ρEABE , ρ˜
E
ABE
)
= D
(
ρEABE , ρ˜
E
ABE
)
.
This was first proven by Helstrom [Hel76]. For completeness, we provide a
proof in Appendix A.2, Theorem A.5.
The distinguishing advantage between the real and ideal systems of
Eq. (10) thus reduces to the trace distance between the quantum states
gathered by the distinguisher. In the following, we usually omit E where it
is clear that we are maximizing over the distinguisher strategies, and simply
express the security criterion as
D(ρABE , ρ˜ABE) ≤ ε , (11)
where ρABE and ρ˜ABE are the quantum states gathered by the distinguisher
interacting with the real and ideal systems, respectively.
4.2 Simulator
In the real setting (Figure 3.2a), Eve has full control over the quantum
channel and obtains the entire classical transcript of the protocol. So for
the real and ideal settings to be indistinguishable, a simulator σqkdE must
generate the same communication as in the real setting. This can be done
19
by internally running Alice’s and Bob’s protocol (πqkdA , π
qkd
B ), producing the
same messages at Eve’s interface as the real system. However, instead of
letting this (simulated) protocol decide the value of the key as in the real
setting, the simulator only checks whether they actually produce a key or an
error message, and presses the switch on the secret key resource accordingly.
We illustrate this in Figure 4.1.
key
Secret key K
k,⊥ k,⊥
σqkd
E
πqkd
A
πqkd
B
0, 1
tρ ρ′
Figure 4.1 – The ideal QKD system—Alice has access to the left interface,
Bob to the right interface and Eve to the lower interface—consists of the ideal
secret key resource and a simulator σqkdE .
The security criterion from Eq. (11) can now be simplified by noting that
with this simulator, the states of the ideal and real systems are identical
when no key is produced. The outputs at Alice’s and Bob’s interfaces are
classical, elements of the set {⊥} ∪ K, where ⊥ symbolizes an error and K
is the set of possible keys. The states of the real and ideal systems can be
written as
ρABE = p
⊥|⊥A,⊥B〉〈⊥A,⊥B| ⊗ ρ
⊥
E
+
∑
kA,kB∈K
pkA,kB |kA, kB〉〈kA, kB | ⊗ ρ
kA,kB
E ,
ρ˜ABE = p
⊥|⊥A,⊥B〉〈⊥A,⊥B| ⊗ ρ
⊥
E
+
1
|K|
∑
k∈K
|k, k〉〈k, k| ⊗
∑
kA,kB∈K
pkA,kBρ
kA,kB
E .
Plugging these in Eq. (11) we get
D(ρABE , ρ˜ABE) = (1− p
⊥)D
(
ρ⊤ABE , τAB ⊗ ρ
⊤
E
)
≤ ε , (12)
where
ρ⊤ABE :=
1
1− p⊥
∑
kA,kB∈K
pkA,kB |kA, kB〉〈kA, kB | ⊗ ρ
kA,kB
E (13)
is the renormalized state of the system conditioned on not aborting and
τAB :=
1
|K|
∑
k∈K |k, k〉〈k, k| is a perfectly uniform shared key.
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4.3 Correctness & secrecy
We now break Eq. (12) down into two components, often referred to as cor-
rectness and secrecy, and recover the security definition for QKD introduced
in [RK05,BHL+05,Ren05]. The correctness of a QKD protocol refers to the
probability that Alice and Bob end up holding different keys. We say that
a protocol is εcor-correct if for all adversarial strategies,
Pr[KA 6= KB ] ≤ εcor , (14)
whereKA andKB are random variables over the alphabetK∪{⊥} describing
Alice’s and Bob’s outputs.19 The secrecy of a QKD protocol measures how
close the final key is to a distribution that is uniform and independent of
the adversary’s system. Let p⊥ be the probability that the protocol aborts,
and ρ⊤AE be the resulting state of the AE subsystems conditioned on not
aborting. A protocol is εsec-secret if for all adversarial strategies,
(1− p⊥)D
(
ρ⊤AE , τA ⊗ ρ
⊤
E
)
≤ εsec , (15)
where the distance D(·, ·) is the trace distance and τA is the fully mixed
state.20
Theorem 4.1. If a QKD protocol is εcor-correct and εsec-secret, then Eq. (10)
is satisfied for ε = εcor + εsec.
Proof. Let us define γABE to be a state obtained from ρ
⊤
ABE (Eq. (13)) by
throwing away the B system and replacing it with a copy of A, i.e.,
γABE =
1
1− p⊥
∑
kA,kB∈K
pkA,kB |kA, kA〉〈kA, kA| ⊗ ρ
kA,kB
E .
From the triangle inequality we get
D(ρ⊤ABE , τAB ⊗ ρ
⊤
E) ≤ D(ρ
⊤
ABE , γABE) +D(γABE , τAB ⊗ ρ
⊤
E) .
Since in the states γABE and τAB ⊗ ρ
⊤
E the B system is a copy of the
A system, it does not modify the distance. Furthermore, trB(γABE) =
trB(ρ
⊤
ABE). Hence
D(γABE , τAB ⊗ ρ
⊤
E) = D(γAE, τA ⊗ ρ
⊤
E) = D(ρ
⊤
AE, τA ⊗ ρ
⊤
E) .
19This can equivalently be written as (1 − p⊥) Pr
[
K⊤A 6= K
⊤
B
]
≤ εcor, where p
⊥ is the
probability of aborting and K⊤A and K
⊤
B are Alice and Bob’s keys conditioned on not
aborting.
20Eq. (15) is a reformulation of Eq. (1).
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For the other term note that
D(ρ⊤ABE , γABE)
≤
∑
kA,kB
pkA,kB
1− p⊥
D
(
|kA, kB〉〈kA, kB | ⊗ ρ
kA,kB
E , |kA, kA〉〈kA, kA| ⊗ ρ
kA,kB
E
)
=
∑
kA 6=kB
pkA,kB
1− p⊥
=
1
1− p⊥
Pr[KA 6= KB] .
Putting the above together with Eq. (12), we get
D(ρABE , ρ˜ABE) = (1− p
⊥)D(ρ⊤ABE , τAB ⊗ ρ
⊥
E)
≤ Pr[KA 6= KB ] + (1− p
⊥)D(ρ⊤AE , τA ⊗ ρ
⊤
E) .
Remark 4.2 (Tightness of the security criteria). In Theorem 4.1 we prove a
bound on the second security condition of Definition 2.1 for QKD in terms
of the correctness and secrecy of the protocol. The converse can also be
shown: if Eq. (10) holds for some ε, then the corresponding QKD protocol
is both ε-correct and 2ε-secret.21
4.4 Robustness
So far in this section we have discussed the security of a QKD protocol with
respect to a malicious Eve using the second condition from Definition 2.1
(Eq. (10)). A QKD protocol which always aborts without producing any
key trivially satisfies Eq. (10) with ε = 0, but is not a useful protocol at
all! The real system must not only be indistinguishable from ideal when an
adversary is present, but also when the adversarial interfaces are covered
by filters emulating honest behavior. This is modeled by the first condition
from Definition 2.1, namely Eq. (9) for QKD. If no adversary is tampering
with the quantum channel— only natural non-malicious noise is present—
we expect a secret key to be generated with high probability. This can
be captured by designing the filter ♦E to allow a key to be produced with
high probability: if the real system does not generate a key with the same
probability, this immediately results in a gap noticeable by the distinguisher.
The probability of a key being generated depends on the noise introduced
by the filter ♯E covering the adversarial interface of the insecure quantum
channel Q in the real system (illustrated in Figure 3.2b). Suppose that this
21The factor 2 is a result of the existence of the simulator σE in the security definition.
We cannot exclude that for some specific QKD protocol there exists a different simulator
σ¯qkd
E
—different from the one used in this proof— generating a state ρ¯E when interacting
with the distinguisher, such that D
(
ρ⊤AE, τA ⊗ ρ¯
⊤
E
)
≤ D
(
ρ⊤AE , τA ⊗ ρ
⊤
E
)
. However, by the
triangle inequality we also have that for any ρ¯E, D
(
ρ⊤AE, τA ⊗ ρ¯
⊤
E
)
≥ 1
2
D
(
ρ⊤AE, τA ⊗ ρ
⊤
E
)
.
Hence the failure ε of the generic simulator used in this proof is at most twice larger than
optimal.
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noise is parametrized by a value q, e.g., a depolarizing channel with proba-
bility q. For every q, the protocol has a probability of aborting, δ, which is
called the robustness. Let ♯qE denote a filter of the channel Q that models
this noise, and let ♦δE denote the filter of the ideal key resource K, which
flips the switch to prevent a key from being generated with corresponding
probability δ. Eq. (9) thus becomes
πqkdA π
qkd
B (Q‖A)(♯
q
E‖♭E) ≈ε K♦
δ
E , (16)
where varying q and δ results in a family of real and ideal systems.
We now prove that in this case the failure ε from Eq. (16) is bounded
by εcor + εsec. Note that this statement is only useful if the probability of
aborting, δ, is small for reasonable noise models q.
Lemma 4.3. If the filters from Eq. (16) are parametrized such that ♦δE
aborts with exactly the same probability as the protocol (πqkdA , π
qkd
B ) run on
the noisy channel Q♯qE, then the availability of the protocol is bounded by the
security, i.e.,
d
(
πqkdA π
qkd
B (Q‖A)(♯
q
E‖♭E),K♦
δ
E
)
≤ d
(
πqkdA π
qkd
B (Q‖A),Kσ
qkd
E
)
,
where the simulator σqkdE is the one used in the previous sections, introduced
in Section 4.2, Figure 4.1.
Proof. Since ♦δE aborts with exactly the same probability as the real system
and since σqkdE simulates the real system, we can substitute σ
qkd
E (♯
q
E‖♭E) for
♦δE. The result then follows, because the converter ♯
q
E‖♭E on both the real
and ideal systems can only decrease their distance (Eq. (7)).
5 Examples of composition
It is immediate from the AC framework [MR11] that the composition of
two protocols satisfying Definition 2.1 is still secure.22 In this section we
attempt to provide a better feeling for protocol composition by illustrating it
with several examples. We compose QKD in series and in parallel, and show
that—as a result of the triangle inequality and the security of the individual
protocols— the corresponding composed real systems are indistinguishable
from the composed ideal systems.
In Section 5.1 we first look at a situation in which part of the key is
known to the adversary. In Section 5.2 we compose QKD with a one-time
pad. And in Section 5.3 we compose two runs of a QKD protocol in par-
allel. We provide a more extensive example of protocol composition in
22See Appendix C.2 for a proof sketch.
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Appendix D, where we model the security of authentication and compose it
with QKD, resulting in a key expansion protocol.
To simplify the examples, we only consider security in the presence of an
adversary and ignore the first condition from Definition 2.1. For the same
reason, when writing up the security condition with the trace distance, we
hard-code the simulator used in Section 4 in the security criterion. Further-
more, as shown in Section 4.2, conditioned on aborting, the real and ideal
systems of QKD are identical, so the security criterion can be reduced to
the case in which the QKD protocol terminates with a shared key between
Alice and Bob, which happens with probability 1− pabort. With these sim-
plifications, a QKD protocol is ε-secure if
(1− pabort)D(ρABE , τAB ⊗ ρE) ≤ ε , (17)
where τAB is a perfect shared key and ρABE and τAB ⊗ ρE are the final
states, conditioned on producing a key, that the distinguisher holds after
interacting with the real and ideal systems, respectively.
5.1 Partially known key
The accessible information given in Eq. (2) is shown to be insufficient to
define security for a QKD protocol by considering a setting in which part
of the key K is available to Eve [KRBM07]. This allows her to guess the
remaining bits of the key, which would not have been possible had the key
been distributed using an ideal resource. We analyze exactly this setting
here, and argue that this does not affect the security of a QKD scheme that
satisfies Definition 2.1.
To model this partial knowledge of the key, let Alice run a protocol π′A
that receives part of the secret key—generated either by a QKD protocol or
by an ideal resource—and sends it on a channel to Eve. Plugging this in the
real and ideal QKD systems from Figures 3.2a and 4.1, we get Figure 5.1.
It is immediate from Figure 5.1 that π′A cannot increase the distance be-
tween the real and ideal systems and therefore cannot compromise security:
the systems in gray can be run internally by a distinguisher attempting to
guess whether it is interacting with the real or ideal QKD system, so this
case is already bounded by the security of QKD.
This reasoning is summed up in the following equation, which can be
directly derived from Eq. (7):
πqkdA π
qkd
B (Q‖A) ≈ε Kσ
qkd
E =⇒ π
′
Aπ
qkd
A π
qkd
B (Q‖A) ≈ε π
′
AKσ
qkd
E .
The same can be obtained from the properties of the trace distance if
we write out explicitly the states gathered by the distinguisher. If the QKD
protocol is ε-secure, we have from Eq. (17) that
(1− pabort)D(ρABE , τAB ⊗ ρE) ≤ ε,
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πqkd
A
πqkd
B
π′A
t
k1A kB
ρ ρ′
k2A
k1A
(a) The QKD protocol (πqkdA , π
qkd
B ) generates a pair of keys (kA, kB). Alice
then runs π′A, which provides the first part of kA = k
1
A‖k
2
A to Eve. The
drawing of the insecure quantum channel and authentic classical channel have
been removed to simplify the figure.
key
Secret key
π′A
k2 k
σqkd
E
0, 1
tρ ρ′
k1
k1
(b) The ideal secret key resource generates a key k = k1‖k2, part of which
is provided to Eve by π′A. A simulator σ
qkd
E pads the ideal key resource to
generate the same communication as in the real setting.
Figure 5.1 – Alice runs a protocol π′A which reveals the first half of her key to
Eve. In each figure, Alice and Bob have access to the left and right interfaces,
and Eve to the lower interface. If we remove the parts in gray we recover the
real and ideal systems of QKD.
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where ρABE is the state gathered by a distinguisher interacting with the real
QKD system (Figure 3.2a) and τAB⊗ρE is the state gathered by interacting
with the ideal system (Figure 4.1), conditioned on the protocol not aborting.
A distinguisher interacting with either of the two systems from Figure 5.1
gets extra information at Eve’s interface, namely the first part of Alice’s key
k1, and only the second part of that key k2 at Alice’s interface. The complete
states gathered by interacting with Figure 5.1a and Figure 5.1b are given
by ρA′BE′ = ρA2BA1E and ρ˜A′BE′ = τA2BA1 ⊗ ρE , respectively, where the
orignal system A = A1A2 containing Alice’s key is split in two, A
′ = A2 and
E′ = A1E. These can be obtained from ρABE and τAB ⊗ ρE by a unitary
map which simply permutes the registers. Thus, the trace distance does not
increase. So we have
(1− pabort)D(ρA′BE′ , ρ˜A′BE′) = (1− pabort)D(ρABE , τAB ⊗ ρE) ≤ ε .
If we analyze the same situation from the perspective of an adversary
that can access only the E-interface, composing QKD with a protocol that
reveals k1 results in a net gain of information for this adversary. But as
shown above, for a distinguisher that also receives the outputs of the honest
players— the generated secret keys— there is no gain.
5.2 Sequential composition of key distribution and one-time
pad
If we compose a one-time pad (depicted in Figure 2.3) and a QKD pro-
tocol (depicted in Figure 3.2a), we obtain Figure 5.2a, where the secret
key resource used by the one-time pad is replaced by the QKD protocol.
We showed in Section 2.2 that a one-time pad constructs a secure channel
(Figure 2.4), which provides Eve with only one functionality, learning the
length of the message. However, this was if the one-time pad protocol had
access to a secret key resource with a blank E-interface, as in Figure 3.1a.
In reality, QKD constructs a resource that allows Eve to prevent a key from
being generated, as in Figure 3.1b. It can easily be shown that with access
to this resource, a one-time pad constructs a secure channel with two con-
trols at Eve’s interface: one for preventing any message from being sent and
a second for learning the length of the message if she did not activate the
first. This resource is illustrated in Figure 5.2c, along with the appropriate
simulator for constructing this resource with a one-time pad and a QKD pro-
tocol: the combination of the two simulators used in the individual proofs
of the one-time pad (Figure 2.5) and QKD (Figure 4.1).
We now wish to show that the combination of an ε-secure QKD protocol
and a (perfect) one-time pad results in a combined scheme that constructs
within ε a secure channel from authentic classical channels23 and an insecure
23The QKD protocol requires a two-way authentic channel, whereas the one-time pad
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y y
y
(a) The composition of a one-time pad and a QKD protocol. The authentic
channels and insecure quantum channels used have not been depicted as boxes
to simplify the figure.
key
Secret key K
y =
x⊕ k
πotp
A
x =
y ⊕ k
πotp
B
k k
σqkd
E
0, 1
tρ ρ′
y y
y
xA xB
(b) A hybrid system consisting of a real one-time pad and ideal secret key
resource with simulator.
Secure channel S
σqkd
E
σotp
E
x
0, 1
x
|x|
ρ ρ′ t y
(c) The ideal secure channel and corresponding composed simulator σotpE σ
qkd
E .
Figure 5.2 – Steps in the security proof of the sequential composition of a
one-time pad and QKD protocol. In each figure, Alice and Bob have access to
the left and right interfaces, and Eve to the lower interface. If we remove the
gray parts from Figures 5.2a and 5.2b, we recover the real and ideal systems
of QKD. If we remove the dashed parts from Figures 5.2b and 5.2c we recover
the real and ideal systems of the one-time pad.
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quantum channel. To do this, we look at an intermediary step consisting of
the combination of an ideal secret key resource and a one-time pad, which
we illustrate in Figure 5.2b. If we remove the gray parts from Figures 5.2a
and 5.2b, we recover the real and ideal systems of QKD. If the QKD protocol
is ε-secure, then the distinguishing advantage between these two figures can
also be at most ε. Likewise, if we remove the dashed parts from Figures 5.2b
and 5.2c we recover the real and ideal systems of the one-time pad. Since
the one-time pad is perfectly secure, the distinguishing advantage between
these two figures must be 0. It follows from the triangle inequality that the
composition of an ε-secure QKD protocol and a one-time pad is ε-secure.
This reasoning is summed up in the following equation, which can be
directly derived from Eqs. (3), (7) and the triangle inequality (Eq. (6)):
πqkdA π
qkd
B (Q‖A) ≈ε Kσ
qkd
E
πotpA π
otp
B (K‖A) = Sσ
otp
E
}
=⇒ πotpA π
otp
B π
qkd
A π
qkd
B (Q‖A‖A) ≈ε Sσ
otp
E σ
qkd
E .
The same can be obtained from the properties of the trace distance if
we write out explicitly the states gathered by the distinguisher. After a run
of an ε-secure QKD scheme, we know that
(1− pabort)D(ρABE , τAB ⊗ ρE) ≤ ε .
The encryption and decryption operations of the one-time pad, (πotpA , π
otp
B ),
plugged into Figures 5.2a and 5.2b, modify the states ρAB and τAB . They
correspond to a unitary map Eotp : X ×K×K → X ×X ×X which takes the
message xA and Alice’s and Bob’s keys kA, kB , and generates the ciphertext
and Bob’s message while persevering Alice’s message,
Eotp : (xA, kA, kB) 7→ (xA, xA ⊕ kA ⊕ kB , xA ⊕ kA) .
A unitary map does not change the trace distance, so for
ρXAXBY = E
otp(ρXA ⊗ ρAB) and τXAXBY = E
otp(ρXA ⊗ τAB)
we have
(1−pabort)D(ρXAXBY E , τXAXBY ⊗ρE) = (1−pabort)D(ρABE , τAB⊗ρE) ≤ ε ,
where ρXAXBY E and τXAXBY ⊗ ρE are the states held be a distinguisher
interacting with Figures 5.2a and 5.2b, respectively.
We also know that the one-time pad perfectly constructs a secure chan-
nel from an authentic channel and a secret key, i.e., if we remove the sim-
ulator σqkdE from Figures 5.2b and 5.2c, the corresponding systems are in-
distinguishable— a distinguisher interacting with them obtains two states
needs only a single use one-way authentic channel. This distinction is however not relevant
to the current argument, so we refer to both resources as “authentic channels” and use
the same notation, A, for each.
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τXAXBY and τ
′
XAXBY
with D(τXAXBY , τ
′
XAXBY
) = 0. Plugging the simula-
tor σqkdE in Eve’s interface simply results in the state ρE being appended to
τ and τ ′. The final state held by the distinguisher is thus τXAXBY ⊗ ρE and
τ ′XAXBY ⊗ ρE , respectively, with D(τXAXBY ⊗ ρE, τ
′
XAXBY
⊗ ρE) = 0.
By the triangle inequality, the distance between Figures 5.2a and 5.2c is
then
(1− pabort)D(ρXAXBY E , τ
′
XAXBY
⊗ ρE) ≤ ε .
5.3 Parallel composition of key distribution with itself
If two QKD protocols are run in parallel, as illustrated in Figure 5.3a the
adversary can entwine their respective messages as she pleases, e.g, parts of
the state ρ sent on the insecure channel by the first protocol can be input
into the insecure channel of the second protocol. We wish to show that even
in this case, the combined protocol is still 2ε-secure— i.e., indistinguishable
from the parallel compositions of two ideal key resources and their individual
simulators— if each QKD protocol is ε-secure. This ideal case is depicted
in Figure 5.3b.
Like for serial composition, this follows from the triangle inequality. If
the real QKD system is ε-close to the ideal QKD system, then two real
QKD systems in parallel must be ε-close to an ideal and real QKD system
composed in parallel, since otherwise a distinguisher could run a real QKD
system internally in parallel to the system it is testing. Likewise, a real and
ideal QKD system in parallel must be ε-close to two ideal QKD systems
in parallel. And hence two parallel runs of an ε-secure QKD protocol is
2ε-secure.
The trace distance notation does not lend itself to writing up parallel
composition of protocols. So instead of using this notation as in the previous
examples, we write up the reasoning from the paragraph above in more
detail using the resource-converter formalism. If the real and ideal system
of a QKD protocol are ε-close, then
πqkdA π
qkd
B (Q‖A) ≈ε Kσ
qkd
E .
It follows immediately from this and Eq. (7) that(
πqkdA π
qkd
B (Q‖A)
)∥∥∥(πqkdA′ πqkdB′ (Q‖A)) ≈ε (KσqkdE )∥∥∥(πqkdA′ πqkdB′ (Q‖A)) ,(
KσqkdE
)∥∥∥(πqkdA′ πqkdB′ (Q‖A)) ≈ε (KσqkdE )∥∥∥(KσqkdE′ ) .
From the triangle equality (Eq. (6)) we then have(
πqkdA π
qkd
B (Q‖A)
)∥∥∥(πqkdA′ πqkdB′ (Q‖A)) ≈2ε (KσqkdE )∥∥∥(KσqkdE′ ) .
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(a) Two QKD protocols and their respective resources run in parallel.
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(b) Two secret key resources and two simulators run in parallel.
Figure 5.3 – Real and ideal systems for two QKD protocols executed in par-
allel. In each figure, Alice and Bob have access to the left and right interfaces,
and Eve to both the upper and lower interface.
30
Finally, using Eq. (3) to rearrange this expression, we get(
πqkdA π
qkd
B
∥∥πqkdA′ πqkdB′ )(Q‖A‖Q‖A) ≈2ε (K‖K)(σqkdE ∥∥σqkdE′ ) ,
i.e., the parallel composition of two runs of a QKD protocol, πqkdA π
qkd
B
∥∥πqkdA′ πqkdB′ ,
run with authentic classical and insecure quantum channel resources, Q‖A‖Q‖A,
is 2ε-close to the parallel composition of two ideal key resources, K‖K, and
a simulator, σqkdE
∥∥σqkdE′ .
Appendices
In Appendix A we formally define the trace distance and show that it cor-
responds to the distinguishing advantage between two quantum states. We
also prove several lemmas that help interpret its meaning and how to choose
a value in a practical implementation. In Appendix B we discuss an alterna-
tive to the secrecy criterion of Eq. (1), which has appeared in the literature.
In Appendix C we provide some details on technical aspects of the Abstract
Cryptography framework. In Appendix C.1 we discuss how to define a dis-
tinguisher so that the resulting distinguishing advantage is non-increasing
under compositions. In Appendix C.2 we sketch a proof that the security
definition from Definition 2.1 is composable. A complete proof of this can be
found in [MR11,Mau12]. And finally, in Appendix D we model the security
of authentication with universal hashing [WC81, Sti94], then use this as a
subprotocol of QKD to authenticate the classical post-processing. Since this
type of authentication uses a short key (and an insecure classical channel) to
construct an authentic channel and QKD uses an authentic channel (and an
insecure quantum channel) to construct a long key, the composition of the
two is a key expansion protocol, which constructs a long key from a short
key (and insecure channels).
A Trace distance
We have used several times in this work the well-known fact that the dis-
tinguishing advantage between two systems that output states ρ and σ is
equivalent to the trace distance between these states. In this appendix, we
prove this fact, along with several other theorems that help interpret the
meaning of the trace distance.
In Appendix A.1 we first define the trace distance— as well as its classi-
cal counterpart, the total variation distance—and prove some basic lemmas
that can also be found in textbooks such as [NC00]. In Appendix A.2 we
then show the connection between trace distance and distinguishing advan-
tage, which was originally proven by Helstrom [Hel76]. In Appendix A.3 we
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prove that we can alternatively think of the trace distance between a real
and ideal system as a bound on the probability that a failure occurs in the
real system. Finally, in Appendix A.4 we bound two typical information
theory notions of secrecy— the conditional entropy of a key given the eaves-
dropper’s information and her probability of correctly guessing the key— in
terms of the trace distance. Although such measures of information are gen-
erally ill-suited for defining cryptographic security, they can help interpret
the notion of a key being ε-close to uniform.
A.1 Metric definitions
In the case of a classical system, statistical security is defined by the to-
tal variation (or statistical) distance between the probability distributions
describing the real and ideal settings, which is defined as follows.24
Definition A.1 (total variation distance). The total variation distance be-
tween two probability distributions PZ and PZ˜ over an alphabet Z is defined
as
D(PZ , PZ˜) :=
1
2
∑
z∈Z
∣∣PZ(z)− PZ˜(z)∣∣ .
Using the fact that |a−b| = a+b−2min(a, b), the total variation distance
can also be written as
D(PZ , PZ˜) = 1−
∑
z∈Z
min[PZ(z), PZ˜ (z)] . (18)
In the case of quantum states instead of classical random variables, the
total variation distance generalizes to the trace distance. More precisely,
the trace distance between two density operators that are diagonal in the
same orthonormal basis is equal to the total variation distance between the
probability distributions defined by their respective eigenvalues.
Definition A.2 (trace distance). The trace distance between two quantum
states ρ and σ is defined as
D(ρ, σ) :=
1
2
tr |ρ− σ| .
We now introduce some technical lemmas involving the trace distance,
which help us derive the theorems in the next sections. Most of these proofs
are taken from [NC00].
24We employ the same notation D(·, ·) for both the total variation and trace distance,
since the former is a special case of the latter.
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Lemma A.3. For any two states ρ and σ and any operator 0 ≤M ≤ I, the
two following inequalities hold:
D(ρ, σ) ≥ tr(M(ρ− σ)) , (19)
tr(M |ρ− σ|) ≥ |tr(M(ρ− σ))| . (20)
Furthermore, each of these inequalities is tight for some values of M .
The trace distance can thus alternatively be written as
D(ρ, σ) = max
M
tr(M(ρ− σ)) . (21)
Proof. We start with the proof of Eq. (19). Let {λx, |ψx〉}x be the eigenval-
ues and vectors of ρ− σ, and define
Q+ :=
∑
x:λx≥0
λx|ψx〉〈ψx| and Q− :=
∑
x:λx<0
−λx|ψx〉〈ψx| .
We have ρ − σ = Q+ − Q− and |ρ − σ| = Q+ + Q−. Note that since
tr(Q+ −Q−) = tr(ρ− σ) = 0, we have trQ+ = trQ−, hence
D(ρ, σ) =
1
2
tr |ρ− σ| =
1
2
(trQ+ + trQ−) = trQ+ .
If we set Γ+ :=
∑
x:λx≥0
|ψx〉〈ψx|, the projector on Q+, we get
tr(Γ+(ρ− σ)) = trQ+ = D(ρ, σ) .
And for any operator 0 ≤M ≤ I,
tr(M(ρ− σ)) = tr(M(Q+ −Q−)) ≤ tr(MQ+) ≤ trQ+ = D(ρ, σ) .
To prove that Eq. (20) holds, note that for any operator 0 ≤M ≤ I,
|tr(M(ρ− σ))| = |tr(M(Q+ −Q−))|
≤ tr(M(Q+ +Q−)) = tr(M |ρ− σ|) .
Eq. (20) is tight for any operator M which satisfies
|tr(M(Q+ −Q−))| = tr(M(Q+ +Q−)) ,
i.e., any operator such that either 0 ≤ M ≤ Γ+ or 0 ≤ M ≤ Γ−, where Γ+
is defined as above and Γ− :=
∑
x:λx≤0
|ψx〉〈ψx|.
Let {Γx}x be a positive operator-valued measure (POVM)— a set of
operators 0 ≤ Γx ≤ I such that
∑
x Γx = I—and let PX denote the outcome
of measuring a quantum state ρ with {Γx}x, i.e., PX(x) = tr(Γxρ). Our next
lemma says that the trace distance between two states ρ and σ is equal to
the total variation between the outcomes— PX and QX — of an optimal
measurement on the two states.
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Lemma A.4. For any two states ρ and σ,
D(ρ, σ) = max
{Γx}x
D(PX , QX) , (22)
where PX and QX are the probability distributions resulting from measuring
ρ and σ with a POVM {Γx}x, respectively, and the maximization is over
all POVMs. Furthermore, if the two states ρZB and σZB have a classical
subsystem Z, then the measurement satisfying Eq. (22) leaves the classical
subsystem unchanged, i.e., the maximum is reached for a POVM with ele-
ments
Γx =
∑
z
|z〉〈z| ⊗Mzx , (23)
where {|z〉}z is the classical orthonormal basis of Z.
Proof. Using Eq. (20) from Lemma A.3 we get
D(PX , QX) =
1
2
∑
x
|tr(Γx(ρ− σ))|
≤
1
2
∑
x
tr(Γx|ρ− σ|)
=
1
2
tr |ρ− σ| = D(ρ, σ) .
The conditions for equality are given at the end of the proof of Lemma A.3,
e.g., a measurement with Γx = |ψx〉〈ψx|, where {|ψx〉}x are the eigenvectors
of ρ− σ. If ρZB =
∑
z pz|z〉〈z| ⊗ ρ
z
B and σZB =
∑
z qz|z〉〈z| ⊗ σ
z
B, then
ρ− σ =
∑
z
|z〉〈z| ⊗ (pzρ
z
B − qzσ
z
B) ,
and the eigenvectors of ρ − σ have the form |ψz,x〉 = |z〉 ⊗ |ϕ
z
x〉B, where
|ϕzx〉B is an eigenvector of pzρ
z
B−qzσ
z
B . So the optimal measurement, Γz,x =
|z〉〈z| ⊗ |ϕzx〉〈ϕ
z
x|B , satisfies Eq. (23).
A.2 Distinguishing advantage
Helstrom [Hel76] proved that the advantage a distinguisher has in guessing
whether it was provided with one of two states, ρ or σ, is given by the trace
distance between the two, D(ρ, σ).25 We first sketch the classical case, then
prove the quantum version.
Let a distinguisher be given a value sampled according to probability dis-
tributions PZ or PZ˜ , where PZ and PZ˜ are each chosen with probability 1/2.
25Actually, Helstrom [Hel76] solved a more general problem, in which the states ρ and
σ are picked with apriori probabilities p and 1 − p, respectively, instead of 1/2 as in the
definition of the distinguishing advantage.
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Suppose the value received by the distinguisher is z ∈ Z. If PZ(z) > PZ˜(z),
its best guess is that the value was sampled according to PZ . Otherwise,
it should guess that it was PZ˜ . Let Z
′ := {z ∈ Z : PZ(z) > PZ˜(z)} and
Z ′′ := {z ∈ Z : PZ(z) ≤ PZ˜(z)}. There are a total of 2|Z| possible events:
the sample is chosen according to PZ or PZ˜ and takes the value z ∈ Z.
These events have probabilities PZ(z)2 and
P
Z˜
(z)
2 . Conditioned on PZ be-
ing chosen and z being the sampled value, the distinguisher has probability
1 of guessing correctly with the strategy outlined above if z ∈ Z ′, and 0
otherwise. Likewise, if PZ˜ was selected, it has probability 1 of guessing
correctly if z ∈ Z ′′ and 0 otherwise. The probability of correctly guessing
whether it was given a value sampled according to PZ or PZ˜ , which we
denote pdistinguish(PZ , PZ˜), is obtained by summing over all possible events
weighted by their probabilities. Hence
pdistinguish(PZ , PZ˜) =
∑
z∈Z′
PZ(z)
2
+
∑
z∈Z′′
PZ˜(z)
2
=
1
2
(
1−
∑
z∈Z′′
PZ(z)
)
+
1
2
(
1−
∑
z∈Z′
PZ˜(z)
)
= 1−
1
2
∑
z∈Z
min[PZ(z), PZ˜ (z)]
=
1
2
+
1
2
D(PZ , PZ˜) ,
where in the last equality we used the alternative formulation of the total
variation distance from Eq. (18).
We now generalize the argument above to quantum states.
Theorem A.5. For any states ρ and σ, we have
pdistinguish(ρ, σ) =
1
2
+
1
2
D(ρ, σ) .
Proof. If a distinguisher is given one of two states ρ or σ, each with proba-
bility 1/2, its probability of guessing which one it holds is given by a max-
imization of all possible measurements it may do: it chooses some POVM
{Γ0,Γ1}, where Γ0 and Γ1 are positive operators with Γ0 + Γ1 = I, and
measures the state it holds. If it gets the outcome 0, it guesses that it holds
ρ and if it gets the outcome 1, it guesses that it holds σ. The probability of
guessing correctly is given by
pdistinguish(ρ, σ) = max
Γ0,Γ1
[
1
2
tr(Γ0ρ) +
1
2
tr(Γ1σ)
]
=
1
2
max
Γ0
[tr(Γ0ρ) + tr((I − Γ0)σ)]
=
1
2
+
1
2
max
Γ0
tr(Γ0(ρ− σ)) . (24)
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The proof concludes by plugging Eq. (21) in Eq. (24).
A.3 Probability of a failure
The trace distance is used as the security definition of QKD, because the
relevant measure for cryptographic security is the distinguishing advantage
(as discussed in Section 2), and as proven in Theorem A.5, the distinguishing
advantage between two quantum states corresponds to their trace distance.
This operational interpretation of the trace distance involves two worlds, an
ideal one and a real one, and the distance measure is the (renormalized)
difference between the probabilities of the distinguisher correctly guessing
to which world it is connected.
In this section we describe a different interpretation of the total variation
and trace distances. Instead of having two different worlds, we consider one
world in which the outcomes of interacting with the real and ideal systems
co-exist. And instead of these distance measures being a difference between
probability distributions, they become the probability that any (classical)
value occurring in one of the systems does not simultaneously occur in the
other. We call such an event a failure—since one system is ideal, if the other
behaves differently, it must have failed—and the trace distance becomes the
probability of a failure occurring.
Given two random variables Z and Z˜ with probability distributions PZ
and PZ˜ , any distribution PZZ˜ with marginals given by PZ and PZ˜ is called
a coupling of PZ and PZ˜ . The interpretation of the trace distance treated
in this section uses one specific coupling, known as a maximal coupling in
probability theory [Tho00].
Theorem A.6 (maximal coupling). Let PZ and PZ˜ be two probability distri-
butions over the same alphabet Z. Then there exists a probability distribution
PZZ˜ on Z × Z such that
Pr[Z = Z˜] :=
∑
z
PZZ˜(z, z) ≥ 1−D(PZ , PZ˜) (25)
and such that PZ and PZ˜ are the marginals of PZZ˜, i.e.,
PZ(z) =
∑
z˜
PZZ˜(z, z˜) (∀z ∈ Z) (26)
PZ˜(z˜) =
∑
z
PZZ˜(z, z˜) (∀z˜ ∈ Z) . (27)
It turns out that the inequality in Eq. (25) is tight, i.e., one can also
show that for any distribution PZZ˜ , Pr[Z = Z˜] ≤ 1 − D(PZ , PZ˜). We will
however not use this fact here.
Consider now a real system that outputs values given by Z and an ideal
system that outputs values according to Z˜. Theorem A.6 tells us that there
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exists a coupling of these distributions such that the probability of the real
system producing a different value from the ideal system is bounded by the
total variation distance between PZ and PZ˜ . Thus, the real system behaves
ideally except with probability D(PZ , PZ˜).
We first prove this theorem, then in Corollary A.7 here below we apply
it to quantum systems.
Proof of Theorem A.6. Let QZZ˜ be the real function on Z × Z defined by
QZZ˜(z, z˜) =
{
min[PZ(z), PZ˜(z˜)] if z = z˜
0 otherwise
(for all z, z˜ ∈ Z). Furthermore, let RZ and RZ˜ be the real functions on Z
defined by
RZ(z) = PZ(z)−QZZ˜(z, z) ,
RZ˜(z˜) = PZ˜(z˜)−QZZ˜(z˜, z˜) .
We then define PZZ˜ by
PZZ˜(z, z˜) = QZZ˜(z, z˜) +
1
D(PZ , PZ˜)
RZ(z)RZ˜(z˜) .
We now show that PZZ˜ satisfies the conditions of the theorem. For this,
we note that for any z ∈ Z
RZ(z) = PZ(z) −min[PZ(z), PZ˜ (z)] ≥ 0 ,
i.e., RZ , and, likewise, RZ˜ , are nonnegative. Since QZZ˜ is by definition also
nonnegative, we have that PZZ˜ is nonnegative, too. From Eq. (26) or (27),
which we will prove below, it follows that PZZ˜ is also normalized. Hence,
PZZ˜ is a valid probability distribution.
To show Eq. (25) we use again the non-negativity of RZ and RZ˜ , which
implies∑
z
PZZ˜(z, z) ≥
∑
z
QZZ˜(z, z) =
∑
z
min[PZ(z), PZ˜(z)] = 1−D(PZ , PZ˜) ,
where in the last equality we used the alternative formulation of the total
variation distance from Eq. (18).
To prove Eq. (26), we first note that∑
z˜
RZ˜(z˜) =
∑
z˜
PZ˜(z˜)−
∑
z˜
QZZ˜(z˜, z˜)
= 1−
∑
z˜
min[PZ(z˜), PZ˜(z˜)] = D(PZ , PZ˜) .
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Using this we find that for any z ∈ Z
∑
z˜
PZZ˜(z, z˜) =
∑
z˜
QZZ˜(z, z˜) +RZ(z)
1
D(PZ , PZ˜)
∑
z˜
RZ˜(z˜)
= QZZ˜(z, z) +RZ(z) = PZ(z) .
By symmetry, this also proves Eq. (27).
In the case of quantum states, Theorem A.6 can be used to couple the
outcomes of any observable applied to the quantum systems.
Corollary A.7. For any states ρ and σ with trace distance D(ρ, σ) ≤ ε, and
any measurement given by its POVM operators {Γw}w with outcome proba-
bilities PW (w) = tr(Γwρ) and PW˜ (w) = tr(Γwσ), there exists a coupling of
PW and PW˜ such that
Pr[W 6= W˜ ] ≤ D(ρ, σ) .
Proof. Immediate by combining Lemma A.4 and Theorem A.6.
Corollary A.7 tells us that if two systems produce states ρ and σ, then for
any observations made on those systems there exists a coupling for which the
values of each measurement will differ with probability at most D(ρ, σ). It is
instructive to remember that this operational meaning is not essential to the
security notion or part of the framework in any way. It is an intuitive way
of understanding the trace distance, so as to better choose a suitable value.
It allows this distance to be thought of as a maximum failure probability,
and the value for ε to be chosen accordingly.
A.4 Measures of uncertainty
Non-composable security models often use measures of uncertainty to quan-
tify how much information an adversary might have about a secret, e.g., en-
tropy as used by Shannon to prove the security of the one-time pad [Sha49].
These measures are often weaker than what one obtains using a global dis-
tinguisher, and in general do not provide good security definitions. They
are however quite intuitive and in order to further illustrate the quantita-
tive value of the distinguishing advantage, we derive bounds on two of these
measures of uncertainty in terms of the trace distance, namely on the proba-
bility of guessing the secret key in Appendix A.4.1 and on the von Neumann
entropy of the secret key in Appendix A.4.2.
A.4.1 Probability of guessing
Let ρKE =
∑
k∈K pk|k〉〈k|K ⊗ ρ
k
E be the joint state of a secret key in the K
subsystem and Eve’s information in the E subsystem. To guess the value of
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the key, Eve can pick a POVM {Γk}k∈K, measure her system, and output the
result of the measurement. Given that the key is k, her probability of having
guessed correctly is tr(Γkρ
k
E). The average probability of guessing correctly
for this measurement is then given by the sum over all k, weighted by their
respective probabilities pk. And Eve’s probability of correctly guessing the
key is defined by taking the maximum over all measurements,
pguess(K|E)ρ := max
{Γk}
∑
k∈K
pk tr
(
Γkρ
k
E
)
. (28)
Lemma A.8. For any bipartite state ρKE with classical K,
pguess(K|E)ρ ≤
1
|K|
+D(ρKE, τK ⊗ ρE) ,
where τK is the fully mixed state.
Proof. Note that for M :=
∑
k |k〉〈k| ⊗ Γk, where {Γk} maximizes Eq. (28),
the guessing probability can equivalently be written
pguess(K|E)ρ = tr(MρKE) .
Furthermore,
tr[M(τK ⊗ ρE)] =
1
|K|
.
In Lemma A.3 we proved that for any operator 0 ≤M ≤ I,
tr(M(ρ− σ)) ≤ D(ρ, σ) .
Setting ρ = ρKE and σ = τK ⊗ ρE in the above inequality, we finish the
proof:
tr(MρKE) ≤ tr(M(τK ⊗ ρE)) +D(ρKE, τK ⊗ ρE) ,
=⇒ pguess(K|E)ρ ≤
1
|K|
+D(ρKE, τK ⊗ ρE) .
A.4.2 Entropy
Let ρKE =
∑
k∈K pk|k〉〈k|K ⊗ ρ
k
E be the joint state of a secret key in the K
subsystem and Eve’s information in the E subsystem. We wish to bound the
von Neumann entropy of K given E— S(K|E)ρ = S(ρKE)− S(ρE), where
S(ρ) := − tr(ρ log ρ)— in terms of the trace distance D(ρKE, τK ⊗ ρE). We
first derive a lower bound on the von Neumann entropy, using the following
theorem from Alicki and Fannes [AF04].
Theorem A.9 (From [AF04]). For any bipartite states ρAB and σAB with
trace distance D(ρ, σ) = ε ≤ 1/4 and dimHA = dA, we have
|S(A|B)ρ − S(A|B)σ | ≤ 8ε log dA + 2h(2ε) ,
where h(p) = −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p) is the binary entropy.
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Corollary A.10. For any state ρKE with D(ρKE, τK ⊗ ρE) = ε ≤ 1/4,
where τK is the fully mixed state, we have
S(K|E)ρ ≥ (1− 8ε) log |K| − 2h(2ε).
Proof. Immediate by plugging ρKE and τK ⊗ ρE in Theorem A.9.
Given the von Neumann entropy of K conditioned on E, S(K|E)ρ, one
can also upper bound the trace distance of ρKE from τK ⊗ ρE by relating
S(K|E)ρ to the relative entropy of ρKE to τK ⊗ ρE— the relative entropy
of ρ to σ is defined as S(ρ‖σ) := tr(ρ log ρ)− tr(ρ log σ).
Lemma A.11. For any quantum state ρKE,
D(ρKE, τK ⊗ ρE) ≤
√
1
2
(log |K| − S(K|E)ρ) .
Proof. From the definitions of the relative and von Neumann entropies we
have
S(ρKE‖τK ⊗ ρE) = log |K| + S(ρKE‖idK ⊗ρE) = log |K| − S(K|E)ρ,
where idK is the identity matrix. We then use the following bound on the
relative entropy [OP93, Theorem 1.15] to conclude the proof:
S(ρ‖σ) ≥ 2(D(ρ, σ))2.
Corollary A.10 and Lemma A.11 can be written together in one equation,
upper and lower bounding the conditional von Neumann entropy:
(1− 8ε) log |K| − 2h(2ε) ≤ S(K|E)ρ ≤ log |K| − 2ε
2 ,
where ε = D(ρKE, τK ⊗ ρE).
B Alternative secrecy criterion
In Section 4 we derived two conditions— secrecy and correctness— that to-
gether imply that a real QKD system is indistinguishable from the ideal
one. An alternative definition for ε-secrecy was proposed in the litera-
ture [TSSR10,TLGR12]:
(1− pabort)min
σE
D(ρKE, τK ⊗ σE) ≤ ε . (29)
This alternative notion is equivalent to the standard definition of secrecy
(Eq. (1)) up to a factor 2, as can be seen by the following calculation. Let
ϕE be the state for which the minimum in Eq. (29) is achieved. Then,
D(ρKE, τK ⊗ ρE) ≤ D(ρKE, τK ⊗ ϕE) +D(τK ⊗ ϕE , τK ⊗ ρE)
≤ 2D(ρKE, τK ⊗ ϕE) .
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We thus have
D(ρKE, τK ⊗ ρE) ≤ 2min
σE
D(ρKE, τK ⊗ σE) ≤ 2D(ρKE, τK ⊗ ρE) .
This means that any QKD scheme proven secure with one definition is still
secure according to the other, with a minor adjustment of the failure param-
eter ε.
However, we do not know how to derive this alternative notion from
a composable framework. In particular, it is not clear if the failure ε from
Eq. (29) is additive under parallel composition. For example, the concatena-
tion of two keys that each, individually, satisfy Eq. (29), could possibly have
distance from uniform greater than 2ε. For this reason, the arXiv version
of [TLGR12] was updated to use Eq. (1) instead.
C More Abstract Cryptography
C.1 Distinguishing metric
A distinguisher has been introduced as a single entity that has to guess
which of two systems it is holding. Mathematically, it is more convenient to
model a distinguisher as a set D. Each element D ∈ D is a system with n+1
interfaces. n of them connect to the n interfaces of a resource R or S and the
last interface outputs a bit, as illustrated in Figure 2.2 on page 7. Thus, for
any D ∈ D and any compatible system R, D(R) is a binary random variable.
The distinguishing advantage can be rewritten as
dD(R, S) = max
D∈D
Pr[D(R) = 1]− Pr[D(S) = 1] .
For a set D to be a valid distinguisher, it has to be closed under compo-
sition with all resources and converters. For a converter α and a resource T,
define
D(α·) : R 7→ D(αR)
D(·‖T) : R 7→ D(R‖T) .
A distinguisher D is closed under composition with a set of converters Σ
and a set of resources Γ,26 if for all D ∈ D, all α ∈ Σ and all T ∈ Γ,
D(α·) ∈ D and D(·‖T) ∈ D . (30)
26For a set of converters Σ and a set of resources Γ to be valid, they also have to be
closed under composition, i.e., for all α, β ∈ Σ and all R, S ∈ Γ,
αβ ∈ Σ , α‖β ∈ Σ , αR ∈ Γ , and R‖S ∈ Γ .
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For example, the set of all possible distinguishers is closed under composi-
tion with the sets of all possible converters and resources, and is used for
information-theoretic security. The set of all efficient distinguishers is closed
under composition with the sets of all efficient converters and resources, and
is used for computational security. The fact that the distinguishing advan-
tage is non-increasing under composition (see Eq. (7) on page 11) follows
directly from the closure of the distinguisher, Eq. (30).
C.2 Generic protocol composition
In this section we briefly sketch why the security criteria of Definition 2.1
guarantee that the composition of two secure protocols is also secure. We
write up the argument in the case where an adversary is present (Eq. (ii)
from Definition 2.1). The case with no adversary follows similarly with
the simulator σ removed and a filter connected to Eve’s interface of every
resource. Proofs of this can be found in [MR11,Mau12].
C.2.1 Sequential composition
Let protocols π and π′ construct S♦ from R♯ and T from S♦ within ε and
ε′, respectively, i.e.,
R♯
π,ε
−−→ S♦ and S♦
π′,ε′
−−−→ T .
It then follows from the triangle inequality of the distinguishing metric that
π′π constructs T from R♯ within ε+ ε
′,
R♯
π′π,ε+ε′
−−−−−→ T .
To see why this holds when an adversary is present, note that since πR
cannot be distinguished from Sσ with advantage greater than ε, by Eq. (7)
a distinguisher running π′ in particular cannot distinguish them. Hence
π′πR ≈ε π
′
Sσ .
Likewise, a distinguisher running σ does not know if it is interacting with
π′S or Tσ′, i.e.,
π′Sσ ≈ε′ Tσ
′σ .
Combining the two equations above, we get
π′πR ≈ε+ε′ Tσ
′σ .
So there exists a simulator, namely σ′σ, such that the real and ideal
systems cannot be distinguished with advantage greater than ε+ ε′.
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C.2.2 Parallel composition
The argument for parallel composition is similar to that of sequential com-
position. Let π and π′ construct S♦ and S
′
 from R♯ and R
′
♭ within ε and ε
′,
respectively, i.e.,
R♯
π,ε
−−→ S♦ and R
′
♭
π′,ε′
−−−→ S′ .
If these resources and protocols are composed in parallel, we find that π‖π′
constructs S♦‖S
′
 from R♯‖R
′
♭ within ε+ ε
′,
R♯‖R
′
♭
π‖π′,ε+ε′
−−−−−−→ S♦‖S
′
 ,
where R♯‖R
′
♭
:= (R‖R′, ♯‖♭) is the filtered resource consisting of the parallel
composition of the resources and filters from R♯ and R
′
♭.
For the case where an adversary is present, this can be proven as follows.
From the definition of parallel composition of converters in Eq. (3) we have(
π‖π′
)(
R‖R′
)
= (πR)‖
(
π′R′
)
.
Since for some σ, πR cannot be distinguished from Sσ with advantage greater
than ε, by Eq. (7) running π′R′ in parallel cannot help the distinguisher,
hence
πR‖π′R′ ≈ε Sσ‖π
′
R
′ .
For the same reason we also have
Sσ‖π′R′ ≈ε′ Sσ‖S
′σ′ .
Combining the equations above and one more use of Eq. (3), we obtain(
π‖π′
)(
R‖R′
)
≈ε+ε′
(
S‖S′
)(
σ‖σ′
)
.
Thus, there exists a simulator, namely σ‖σ′, such that the real and ideal
systems cannot be distinguished with advantage greater than ε+ ε′.
D Composition of authentication and QKD
In this section we model recursive composition of an authentication protocol
and QKD. Starting with a short (uniform) key, we construct an authentic
channel, which is then used in a QKD protocol to obtain a long key. Part
of this new key is then consumed in another round of authentication, which
is used by QKD, resulting in more shared secret key. This can be repeated
indefinitely. From the composability of the security definitions we immedi-
ately have that the total failure is bounded by the sum of the individual
failures of (each run of) each protocol.
43
The goal of this section is to write this out explicitly: we show that
D(ρAnBnE, ρ˜AnBnE) ≤ n(ε
auth + εqkd) , (31)
where An and Bn are registers containing all shared, unused secret keys gen-
erated in n rounds of authentication and QKD, E contains the adversary’s
information, ρAnBnE and ρ˜AnBnE are the states obtained by a distinguisher
interacting with the real and ideal systems,27 and εauth and εqkd are the
(probabilities of) failure of the authentication and QKD protocols in each
round.28
For this recursive construction it is not necessary to use the (interactive)
authentication protocol of Renner and Wolf [RW03] which only requires
a password. Instead we use the simpler universal hashing of Wegman and
Carter [WC81,Sti94], which appends a tag29 to the message that is sent, but
requires an (almost) uniform key. A more detailed analysis of this authen-
tication method, including key recycling and a proof that strong universal
hashing meets the corresponding security definition can be found in [Por14].
In Appendix D.1 we sketch how to construct an authentic channel from
a shared secret key and insecure channel resource, and provide a generic
simulator. In Appendix D.2 we compose multiple authentication protocols
in parallel so that we may have multiple use authentic channels in QKD. In
Appendix D.3 we compose such a construction with QKD, obtaining a key
expansion protocol. And finally in Appendix D.4 we iteratively compose a
key expansion protocol with itself, resulting in a continuous stream of secret
key bits.
D.1 Authentication
The QKD and one-time pad protocols discussed in this work make use of
authentic channels as depicted in Figure D.1a, which always deliver the cor-
rect message to the receiver. This is however impossible to construct from
an insecure channel, since Eve can always cut the communication between
Alice and Bob, and prevent any message from being transmitted. What can
be constructed, is a channel which guarantees that Bob does not receive a
corrupted message. He either receives the correct message sent by Alice, or
an error, which symbolizes an attempt by Eve to change the message. This
can be modeled by giving Eve’s idealized interface two controls: the first
provides her with Alice’s message, the second allows her to input one bit
that prevents Alice’s message from being delivered to Bob and produces an
error instead. We illustrate this in Figure D.1b.
27Unlike the examples from Section 5, we cannot simplify the state ρ˜AnBnE by condi-
tioning on obtaining a key and writing it as τAnBn ⊗ ρE, because the n repetitions of the
protocol lead to n+ 1 events: it never aborted, aborted after one round, two rounds, etc.
28One can also use different parameters in each round, e.g., so that the failure in round
i is half of that in round i− 1, and the sum
∑
i
(εauthi + ε
qkd
i
) is bounded for all n.
29This tag is often called a message authentication code (MAC) in the literature.
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Alice Bob
Eve
x x
x
(a) A resource that always transmits
Alice’s message to Bob, and provides
Eve with a copy.
Alice Bob
Eve
x
x
x,⊥
0, 1
(b) A resource that allows Eve to de-
cide if Bob gets Alice’s message or
not, but does not allow the message
to be manipulated.
Figure D.1 – The authentic channel on the right can be constructed by an
authentication protocol. The one on the left is a simplification as used in the
one-time pad (Figure 2.3) or QKD (Figure 3.2) constructions.
A construction of this authentic channel resource from an insecure chan-
nel and a shared secret key resource is typically accomplished by comput-
ing the hash hk(x) of the message x, and sending the string x‖hk(x) to
Bob, where k is the shared secret key and {hk}k∈K a family of hash func-
tions [Sti94]. Alice’s part of the authentication protocol πauthA thus gets a
key k from an ideal key resource, a message x from Alice, and sends x‖hk(x)
down the insecure channel. When Bob receives a string x′‖y′, he needs
to check whether y′ = hk(x
′). His part of the protocol gets a key k from
an ideal key resource, a message x′‖y′ from the channel, and outputs x′ if
y′ = hk(x
′), otherwise an error ⊥. If the ideal key resource used by both
players produces an error instead of a key, Alice and Bob abort, and the
protocol is trivially secure. So for simplicity we omit this possibility in the
following, and assume that they always get a shared secret key. This is
depicted in Figure D.2.
y :=
hk(x)
πauthA
y′
?
=
hk(x
′)
πauthB
key
Secret key K
Insecure channel C
k k
x x
′,⊥
x‖y x′‖y′
Figure D.2 – The real authentication system—Alice has access to the left
interface, Bob to the right interface and Eve to the lower interface— consists
of the authentication protocol (πauthA , π
auth
B ), and the secret key and insecure
channel resources, K and C.
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In the case where no adversary is present and filters30 cover Eve’s inter-
faces of Figures D.1b and D.2, the real and ideal systems are indistinguish-
able as they are both identity channels which faithfully transmit x from Alice
to Bob. So in the following we only consider the case where an adversary is
present, condition (ii) in Definition 2.1.
In the ideal setting, the authentic channel (Figure D.1b) has the same
interface on Alice’s and Bob’s sides as the real setting (Figure D.2): Alice
can input a message, and Bob receives either a message or an error. How-
ever, Eve’s interface looks quite different: in the real setting she can modify
the transmission on the insecure channel, whereas in the ideal setting the
adversarial interface provides only controls to read the message and inter-
rupt the transmission. From Definition 2.1 we have that an authentication
protocol constructs the authentic channel if there exists a simulator σauthE
that can recreate the real interface while accessing just the idealized one.
An obvious choice for the simulator is to first generate its own key k and
output x‖hk(x). Then upon receiving x
′‖y′, it checks if x′‖y′ = x‖hk(x) and
cuts the transmission on the authentic channel if this does not hold. We
illustrate this in Figure D.3.
Authentic channel A
σauthE
x
x
x,⊥
0, 1
y = hk(x)
x‖y
?
=
x′‖y′
x‖y x′‖y′
key
Figure D.3 – The ideal authentication system—Alice has access to the left
interface, Bob to the right interface and Eve to the lower interface— consists
of the ideal authentication resource and a simulator σauthE .
An authentication protocol is then ε-secure if Figures D.2 and D.3 are
ε-close, i.e.,
πauthA π
auth
B (K‖C) ≈ε Aσ
auth
E . (32)
Portmann [Por14] showed that Eq. (32) is satisfied if the hash functions used
are ε-almost strongly universal2.
31
30Unlike the case of QKD, here we are not interested in a filter which introduces (honest)
noise on the channel, as this can be removed by encoding the communication with an
appropriate error correcting code. Therefore, the filter on the (real) insecure channel
faithfully forwards the message, and the filter on the (ideal) authentic channel allows the
message to be transmitted.
31A familly of functions is said to be almost strongly universal2 if any two different
messages are almost uniformly mapped to all pairs of tags.
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D.2 Parallel composition of authentication
In Appendix D.1 we modeled one run of an authentication protocol, that
constructs a one-time use authentic channel. In general, QKD protocols
require multiple rounds of authenticated communication. This is achieved
by running the same protocol in parallel multiple times with new keys. It
is straightforward from Eqs. (3), (6), (7) and (32) that ℓ parallel repetitions
of the authentication protocol are ℓε-close to ℓ ideal authentic channels and
simulators in parallel,(
πauthA π
auth
B ‖ · · · ‖π
auth
A π
auth
B
)
(K‖C‖ · · · ‖K‖C)
=
(
πauthA π
auth
B (K‖C)
)
‖ · · · ‖
(
πauthA π
auth
B (K‖C)
)
≈ℓε
(
AσauthE
)
‖ · · · ‖
(
AσauthE
)
= (A‖ · · · ‖A)
(
σauthE ‖ · · · ‖σ
auth
E
)
.
In the following, when we speak of the authentication used in QKD we
always refer to parallel repetitions of the protocol that construct multiple
use authenticated channels A‖ · · · ‖A. For simplicity, we use the same no-
tation for multiple authentic channels as we have for single channels— we
denote the resulting multiple use authentic channel by A, as well as C for
the multiple use insecure channel, K for a key sufficiently long for authen-
ticating every message and εauth for the accumulated failure of all parallel
repetitions in one round of QKD.
D.3 Sequential composition of authentication and key distri-
bution
Let πauth be an authentication protocol which constructs with failure εauth
a (multiple use) authentic channel A from a short secret key of length ℓ, Kℓ,
and an insecure classical channel C,
K
ℓ‖C
πauth,εauth
−−−−−−−→ A .
Let πqkd be a QKD protocol which constructs with failure εqkd a long secret
key of length m, Km, from an authentic channel A and an insecure quantum
channel Q,
A‖Q
πqkd,εqkd
−−−−−−→ Km .
By sequentially composing the two protocols, we immediately have that
πqkdπauth constructs a long secret key Km from a short secret key Kℓ and
insecure channels C and Q, with failure εauth + εqkd,
K
ℓ‖C‖Q
πqkdπauth,εauth+εqkd
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Km .
47
πauthA π
auth
BSecret key Kℓ
πqkd
A
πqkd
B
t,⊥ t′,⊥
z z′ρ ρ
′
kA,⊥ kB ,⊥
(a) The composition of a QKD and authentication protocols. The insecure
channels have not been depicted as boxes to simplify the figure.
Authentic channel Aπ
qkd
A
πqkd
B
σauthE
t,⊥ t,⊥
t 0, 1
z z′
kA,⊥ kB,⊥
ρ ρ′
(b) A hybrid system consisting of a QKD protocol and two-way authentic
channels with simulator.
Secret key Km
σqkd
E
σauthE
k,⊥ k,⊥
0, 1
0, 1
ρ ρ′
t
z z′
(c) The ideal secret key and corresponding composed simulator σqkdE σ
auth
E . This
ideal key resource has two switches preventing the key from being generated:
one to capture an abort from the authentication protocol and one from the
QKD protocol.
Figure D.4 – Steps in the security proof of the composition of QKD and an
authentication protocol. If we remove the gray parts from Figures D.4a and
D.4b, we recover the real and ideal systems of authentication. If we remove
the dashed parts from Figures D.4b and D.4c we recover the real and ideal
systems of QKD.
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The generic argument for sequential composition is given in Appendix C.2.1.
Here we illustrate it in the special case of authentication and QKD, and draw
it in Figure D.4.
Figure D.4a depicts the real world: the two protocols are composed in
sequence and run using the short key and insecure channel resources. In
Figure D.4b we have a system consisting of the real QKD protocol and
the ideal authentic channel and simulator. We know that the black parts
of Figures D.4a and D.4b are εauth-close, so adding the QKD protocol in
gray can only reduce the distance. Figure D.4c depicts the ideal secret
key resource and simulators. By removing the dashed simulator σauthE from
Figures D.4b and D.4c, we recover the real and ideal QKD systems from
Figures 3.2a and 4.1—with an extra switch on the authentic channel in the
real system and on the secret key resource in the ideal system. Since these
are εqkd-close, so are Figures D.4b and D.4c. Putting the two statements
together with the triangle inequality finishes the argument.
This reasoning is summed up in the following equation, which can be
directly derived from Eqs. (3), (6) and (7):
πauthA π
auth
B
(
K
ℓ‖C
)
≈εauth Aσ
auth
E
πqkdA π
qkd
B (A‖Q) ≈εqkd K
mσqkdE

 =⇒
πqkdA π
qkd
B π
auth
A π
auth
B
(
K
ℓ‖C‖Q
)
≈(εauth+εqkd) K
mσqkdE σ
auth
E .
Let ρABE be the state gathered by a distinguisher interacting with the
real system from Figure D.4a and ρ˜ABE be the state gathered by the distin-
guisher interacting with the ideal system from Figure D.4c. By the argument
above we have
D(ρABE , ρ˜ABE) ≤ ε
auth + εqkd .
D.4 Iterated key expansion
In Appendix D.3 we show that the composition of QKD and authentica-
tion— i.e., key expansion— constructs a long key from a short key and
insecure channels. To show that this can be done recursively, we need to
argue that part of the long key can be kept for the next round of key expan-
sion. So far the secret keys have been treated as blocks, entirely consumed
by a protocol, which is not convenient for the analysis of a protocol that
uses only part of a key. Instead, we should think of these key resources—
e.g., Kℓ and Km in Figures D.4a and D.4c— as a parallel composition of
resources that produce a single bit of key, i.e., Kℓ = K11‖ · · · ‖K
1
ℓ , where K
1
i
is the ith instance of a resource K1 that produces one bit of key (or an error
message) at Alice and Bob’s interfaces, and has a switch at Eve’s interface
that decides if it produces the key or error.
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Then, a proof that
K
ℓ‖C‖Q
πqkdπauth,εauth+εqkd
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Km ,
is immediately also a proof that
K
ℓ′‖C‖Q
πqkdπauth,εauth+εqkd
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Km+ℓ
′−ℓ ,
for any ℓ′ ≥ ℓ. Iterating the protocol n times we get
K
ℓ‖Cn‖Qn
(πqkdπauth)
n
,n(εauth+εqkd)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Knm−(n−1)ℓ ,
where Cn and Qn are n instances of the resources C and Q in parallel, and(
πqkdπauth
)n
is n times the sequential composition of πqkdπauth. Eq. (31)
follows immediately from this.
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